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Preface to the second round of the Universal Health Coverage 
Study Series 
 
All over the world countries are implementing pro-poor reforms to advance universal health coverage. The 
widespread trend to expand coverage resulted in the inclusion of the “achieving universal health coverage 
by 2030” target in the Sustainable Development Agenda.  Progress is monitored through indicators 
measuring gains in financial risk protection and in access to quality essential health-care services.  
The Universal Health Coverage (UHC) Studies Series was launched in 2013 with the objective of sharing 
knowledge regarding pro-poor reforms advancing UHC in developing countries. The series is aimed at 
policy-makers and UHC reform implementers in low- and middle-income countries.  The Series recognizes 
that there are many policy paths to achieve UHC and therefore does not endorse a specific path or model.  
The Series consists of country case studies and technical papers. The case studies employ a standardized 
approach aimed at understanding the tools –policies, instruments and institutions- used to expand health 
coverage across three dimensions: population, health services and affordability. The approach relies on a 
protocol involving around 300 questions structured to provide a detailed understanding of how countries 
are implementing UHC reforms in the following areas: 
• Progressive Universalism: expanding population coverage while ensuring that the poor and 
vulnerable are not left behind;  
• Strategic Purchasing: expanding the statutory benefits package and developing incentives for its 
effective delivery by health-care providers; 
• Raising revenues to finance health care in fiscally sustainable ways; 
• Improving the availability and quality of health-care providers; and, 
• Strengthening accountability to ensure the fulfillment of promises made between citizens, 
governments and health institutions. 
 
By 2017, the Series had published 24 country case studies and conducted a systematic literature review on 
the impact of UHC reforms. In 2018 the Series will publish an additional15 case studies, A book analyzing 
and comparing the initial 24 country case studies is also available:  Going Universal: How 24 Developing 
Countries are Implementing UHC Reforms from the Bottom Up.  Links to the Series and the book are 
included below.  
Daniel Cotlear, D. Phil.  
Manager and Editor 
Universal Health Coverage Study Series 
Links:  
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/health/publication/universal-health-coverage-study-series  
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/universalhealthcoverage/publication/going-universal-how-24-
countries-are-implementing-universal-health-coverage-reforms-from-bottom-up  
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Executive Summary 
Over the past two decades Russia experienced a significant increase in state-financed entitlements for 
health care through the Program of State Guarantees for Medical Care (PSG).  The PSG, which is 
underpinned by the Constitution was an important element of the social contract implemented by the 
State on the back of rapid economic growth during the 2000s. The PSG is a universal program with uniform 
benefits paid for through a single national pool. The PSG was accompanied by significant supply side 
investments to develop a multi-level service delivery system, substantially increase tertiary care provision, 
strengthen the diagnostic capacity of medical facilities and reduce geographic variations in funding and 
services.   
This case study examines what the increase in state financed entitlements for health meant for coverage 
of the poor in Russia, using the health sector in Russia in the early 1990s as the starting point. The 
economic and political transformations of the early 1990s resulted in a significant deterioration in health 
outcomes and financial protection. Although health outcomes have improved, they continue to lag behind 
that of comparator countries.  
The quantitative evidence presented in this paper suggests that Russia made important gains financial 
protection and access to care for the poor. Much of the improvement in financial protection occurred 
during the late 1990s and early 2000s when rates of catastrophic spending and impoverishment due to 
out-of-pocket (OOP) payments declined dramatically.  Since then, progress has moderated. Financial 
protection indicators worsened slightly following the recent economic crisis, while inpatient use became 
more pro-poor, especially for the elderly, but outpatient use more pro-rich. Despite modest improvements, 
they are significant when compared to the situation in the early 1990s.   
Large PSG related investments and reforms during the 2000s supported the achievement of health gains 
and moderated the reversal of trends during the fiscal crisis. Fiscal redistribution has been used to 
increase resource allocation to less well-off areas. Increased public spending on hospital care helped 
improve access to inpatient care for the poor, particularly the elderly. Increased investment in diagnostic 
equipment at outpatient care facilities is associated with increased access to tests and services, albeit only 
in major cities. A push to reallocate spending towards primary care increased access to both physicians and 
services in rural areas. Limited PSG coverage for outpatient drug purchases means that OOP drug payments 
remain one of the biggest threats to financial risk protection. 
To further deepen and expand coverage for the poor, there is a critical need to narrow the divergence 
between PSG’s de jure and actual coverage. In principle, the PSG provides a uniform benefits package that 
all Russians are entitled to under the Constitution. In practice, underfunding and a lack of clarity over the 
benefits package lead to implicit health care rationing through inadequate access to good quality health 
care services and affordable drugs and supplies. Additional fiscal space for health is needed and health 
policy must make more effective use of available resources. Expanding coverage for outpatient drugs and 
strengthening primary care are immediate priorities. 
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1. Introduction 
Russia’s health sector performance since the early 1990s reflects the economic, political and social 
transformations that took place during the last three decades. The first phase of this transformation 
adversely affected outcomes, access to health care and financial protection. Subsequent economic growth, 
poverty reduction and political commitments to improve coverage have led to gradual improvements, but 
with a time lag.  
The economic, social and political transitions experienced in Russia during the 1990s had deleterious 
effects on all social sectors, including health. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, radical change in the 
political system, and the move from central planning to a market economy hindered sustained economic 
growth and political stability. In the 1990s, the country faced profound economic disruptions, climaxing in 
the 1998 crisis, and political weakness, as it struggled to define a new global and regional position, a 
national identity, and an effective economic model. The health system was directly affected by this 
transition, with coverage and financial protection deteriorating sharply.  
In the 2000s, the economy grew rapidly supporting an improvement in social indicators. Today, Russia is 
an upper-middle income country with an emerging middle class, unique in its economic and political model, 
its size, and its institutions.  Despite a current challenging macroeconomic environment, the Government 
seeks to deepen and strengthen the socio-economic gains achieved. 
Russia’s growth model in the 2000s included a solid social contract. The state played a significant social 
role in guaranteeing citizen welfare. Russian citizens benefited from a rich and comprehensive set of 
entitlements and benefits, among them free health (focus of this case study) and education for all, a 
generous pension system, and heavily subsidized utilities, goods, and services (World Bank, 2016). 
The growth model supported poverty reduction and improved shared prosperity. Poverty rates plunged 
from about 30 percent of the population in 2000 to approximately 11 percent in 2014 based on the national 
poverty line.1 However, recent national poverty rate data suggest that these trends have reversed: after 
reaching a record low of 10.7 percent in 2012, the poverty rate edged up to 10.8 percent in 2013 and to 
13.5 percent in 2016 (national poverty line). Russia ranked among the top performers in the Europe and 
Central Asia (ECA) region in terms of income and consumption growth of the bottom 40 percent of the 
population. Consumption for the bottom 40 percent increased by 5.9 percent annually between 2007 and 
2012—surpassing consumption growth of the total population (5.3 percent) and of the top 60 percent (5.2 
percent). However, consumption fell 1.9 percent during the 2010-2015 crisis years (World Bank, 2016) for 
the bottom 40 percent.  
Health Sector Implications of the Transition 
Russia’s economic and political transitions of the early 1990s triggered one of the biggest collapse in 
health outcome collapses ever seen outside war or pandemic situations. Government health care 
                                                          
1 Using the international US$5 a day poverty line (real 2005 Purchasing Power Parity values), poverty fell even more, 
reaching a low of 7.3 percent in 2012. 
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expenditures declined by one-third in the 1990s. Many secondary and rural facilities that were tied to old 
Soviet enterprises were closed and service discontinued, increasing utilization of costly hospital services. 
Health facilities were forced to charge fees while households incurred large OOP expenditures or had to 
forego care. Public spending only reached above pre-transition levels in real terms in 2006 with the infusion 
of resources from the 2006-2007 National Priority Health Program (World Bank, 2008).  
As a result, Russia’s health outcomes consistently lagged behind those of other comparator countries 
and relative to Russia’s income levels. Life expectancy at birth was 71.4 years in 2015—far below that of 
lower per capita income BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China), Brazil (74) and China (76).  Male life 
expectancy only increased by ten years in Russia since the early 1950s compared to 32 years in China, 21 
in Brazil and 15 and 14 years respectively in regional comparators Finland and Poland (see Figure 1). Non-
communicable diseases (NCDs), in particular cardiovascular diseases and cancer, as well as external causes 
are the main contributors to premature mortality and disability in the Russian Federation exacerbated by 
population ageing.  
Figure 1: Male Life Expectancy at Birth, 1950-1955 to 2010-2015 
 
Source: United Nations Population Division (2015). 
Recent health outcome improvements, albeit modest compared to other countries, reflect both a rise in 
population income and welfare as well as increased access to health services. Life expectancy has 
improved largely due to a reduction in NCD-related deaths. Mortality from cardiovascular diseases (CVDs) 
has decreased by 30 percent and disability from CVDs by a quarter over the period 2010 to 2015. These 
outcomes are the result of efforts to combat the main risk factors, such as the introduction of new tobacco 
control legislation and improvements in access to care for patients with stroke and acute coronary 
syndrome. An overall income rise and sustained poverty reduction have also played a role. There have also 
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been marked improvements in key population health indicators such as infant mortality, maternal 
mortality, and tuberculosis mortality. 
The sustained increase in state-financed health care entitlements was a key element of Russia’s social 
contract and the focus of this UNICO case study. Russia’s flagship Universal Health Coverage program is 
the PSG. The PSG adopts a universal approach to expand coverage, which therefore does not rely on explicit 
targeting. Given the focus of the UNICO series on health care programs for the poor, this case study will 
examine how and to what extent the universal PSG approach improved financial protection and access to 
services for the poor. In order to do this and evaluate the extent of implicit rationing, the case study exploits 
multi-year household survey data covering the period 1994 to 2014), and other smaller surveys carried out 
by national researchers including the HSE and other available evidence. 
The increase in state-financed health care entitlements through the Program of State Guarantees for 
Medical Care during the 2000s was a key element of the social contract. The PSG is financed through a 
combination of employer contributions and federal and regional government subsidies. The right to free 
health care is guaranteed by the country’s Constitution, which states that services are free at the point of 
service. Health care is provided through a combination of public (majority) and private medical 
organizations. Regional Social Health Insurance Funds (SHI Funds) allocate revenue to medical insurance 
organizations (health insurers) that purchase care from providers. The benefits package is comprehensive 
with minimal explicit forms of rationing, although there is considerable implicit rationing.  
 
2. Institutional Architecture of the PSG 
The PSG is underpinned by the Constitution, which states that “all citizens of Russia are entitled to free 
care provided in state and municipal medical facilities and paid from the budget or health insurance”. 
The PSG is a universal program with uniform benefits paid for through a single national pool. Employers 
make SHI contributions on behalf of their employees. Regional governments make SHI contributions on 
behalf of the non-working population. The size of the contribution is the same for all categories of the non-
working population, including unemployed, disabled, veterans, etc.  The benefit package is the same for all 
groups of population – working and non-working, poor and rich, more or less vulnerable. There are no 
separate institutional health programs for the poor. However, some elements of the PSG, such as the 
recent initiative to increase doctors in rural areas were introduced specifically to increase utilization among 
the poor. In principle, the PSG benefits package is the same across all regions. In practice, as discussed in 
Section 6, variations in per capita spending across regions mean that the availability and quality of PSG 
benefits varies by regions as well.  
The PSG is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health (MOH) and regional health authorities2, which are 
also responsible for service delivery planning and organization.  The Federal and regional SHI funds 
manage the SHI part of the Program. There are 85 regional SHI Funds, one for each administrative region 
                                                          
2 In some regions – MOH. 
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(oblast) with the population ranging from half a million to 11 million. A region consists of municipalities, 
some of which have local branches of Regional SHI Funds. Initially, it was envisaged that the funds would 
be completely independent of the MOH and regional health authorities. However, the need to consolidate 
planning and funding left the MOH in control of SHI funds, and in charge of issuing SHI regulations and 
surveying the Federal SHI Fund. Similar subordination exists at the regional level. 
The federally determined PSG is the basis for the regional state guarantee programs. This is in order to: 
(i) specify entitlements in terms of diseases, types of care, conditions and patterns of provision (see section 
7); and, (ii) make the PSG the basis of planning health financing nationwide. To do this, utilization targets 
(“normatives”) (e.g. the number of visits or bed-days per capita) and unit cost rates are used.  Targets are 
used for care planning and projections but not for limiting use, for example for the number of patient visits 
or bed-days.  There are some care management tools, with health insurers controlling the appropriateness 
of hospital admissions, length of stay and processing insurance claim checks, as well as quality of care and 
protection of the rights of the insured, i.e. complaint response. 
The Social Health Insurance Law has significantly increased the influence of the federal government over 
the regional health systems. First, the SHI Law has given the federal government ultimate responsibility 
over ensuring universal coverage and its associated health financing needs.  Second, most SHI contributions 
are centralized in the Federal SHI Fund thereby equalizing regional SHI per capita funding. Third, the Federal 
Fund and the MOH set and monitor performance targets for the regional systems. Finally, the Federal Fund 
manages the entire SHI system, including the approval of regional SHI leaders.  
Though centralization has enhanced health care coverage through the equalization of health funding, it 
has reduced regional governments responsiveness to local needs. There are many examples of the 
excessive vertical administrative control over regional service delivery and resource allocation. Regional 
SHI Funds have to report to regional governments (horizontal link) and the Federal Fund (vertical link), 
which complicates management and limits their responsiveness to local needs. 
 
3. Health Care Financing  
Total health spending was 7.1 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2014, with 62.6 percent from 
government sources (budget and social health insurance funds), and 37.4 percent from OOP sources 
(Table 1).  Total health spending is higher than the average for upper-middle income countries (5.5 percent) 
but lower than the European Union average (10 percent) (World Bank, 2016). 
Public health spending remains relatively low and OOP spending high. In 2014, public health spending in 
Russia was 3.5 percent of GDP, significantly lower than the EU-15 average of 8 percent. The government’s 
share of total health spending and the health sector’s share of total government spending are both lower 
than that in most of Central and Eastern European countries (e.g Croatia, Slovenia, Baltic countries), while 
higher than that in most of former Soviet Union members, e.g. in Armenia and Georgia (Error! Reference 
source not found.).  
17 
 
The share of OOP spending as a percent of total health expenditures, often a crude indicator of the 
degree of financial barriers to access faced by the population, has remained high (Figure 2). The MOH 
estimates OOP spending at 37.4 percent of total health spending, including voluntary health insurance 
(Table 2), and the WHO database at approximately 45 percent. Both estimates are substantially higher than 
the average for Europe, 19 percent (OECD, 2016, p.125). 
Table 1. Health Financing Indicators, Russian Federation and Selected ECA Countries, 2014 
Country/ Region 
Total health 
expenditure 
per capita 
(current US$) 
Total health 
expenditure 
as a share of 
GDP (%) 
Government 
share of total 
health 
expenditure 
(%) 
Out-of-pocket 
share of total 
health 
expenditure 
(%) 
Health share 
of total 
government 
expenditure 
(%) 
Russian Federation 893 5.9 62.6 37.4 9.5 
Armenia 162 4.5 43.0 53.5 7.0 
Croatia 1,050 7.8 81.9 11.2 14.0 
Estonia 1,248 6.4 78.8 20.7 13.5 
Georgia 946 8.6 28.2 66.0 8.9* 
Latvia 921 5.9 63.2 35.1 9.8 
Lithuania 1,063 6.6 67.9 31.3 13.4 
Slovenia 2,161 9.2 71.7 12.1 12.8 
      
Source: World Development Indicators. 
 
Figure 2: Government and Out-Of-Pocket Expenditures on Health in Russia and Comparator Countries 
2012 
 
General revenues from both federal and regional governments as well as social health insurance 
contributions by employers together account for about two-thirds of total health spending (Table 2). 
Russia has a social health insurance model with significant general revenue funding. Employees do not 
make SHI contributions. Regional governments make SHI contributions on behalf of all the non-working 
population, regardless of whether they are poor or not, or are engaged in the formal or informal sector. 
The 2010 Law on Social Health Insurance (SHI Law) sets the minimum contribution rate for each one of the 
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65 regions.3 In addition to making SHI contributions, federal and regional governments directly allocate 
funding to the health sector from general revenues. The size of such allocations is dependent on budget 
priorities determined at the federal and regional levels as discussed below. 
Table 2: Health Funding by Source in Russia in 2014 
Financing sources Percentage of total health expenditure 
Total (public+private+external) (a)=(b)+(h)+(n) 100% in 2014 (4185 bln. roubles) 
Public (b)=(c)+(d)+(e)+(f)+(g)+(h) 62,6 (2620 bln. roubles) 
Central (federal) government revenues (c) 13,6 
 
State/provincial (regional) government revenues (d) 15,4 
Local/municipal government revenues (e) 0,8 
Social security contributions (f) 32,8 
Other (h) - 
Private (i)=(j)+(k)+(l)+(m) 37,4 (1565 bln. roubles) 
Private voluntary health insurance (j) 2,0 
Households out-of-pocket (k) 35,0 
Domestic NGOs (l) 0,1 
Other (m)* 0,3 
Rest of the World (n)=(o)+(p)+(q) - 
Bilateral/multilateral development assistance for health (o) - 
International NGOs (p) - 
Other (q) - 
*Private organizations’ medical benefits for employees (contributions to SHI are not included) 
Source: Flek 2015, p.114 
Public health spending fell during the 1990s, rose in nominal terms during the oil boom and associated 
economic growth of the 2000s but has stalled since 2013 (Figure 3). The increase in fiscal space available 
for health in the 2000s improved the affordability of pharmaceuticals for vulnerable groups, and supported 
investments in new medical equipment and the implementation of disease-specific vertical programs 
(Popovich et al 2011). Spending cuts since 2013 resulted in the rationalization of service supply through 
reductions in beds and medical personnel and the merging of urban polyclinics and hospitals. Both these 
trends are discussed in the next section. 
                                                          
3  A region is a major administrative unit in Russia with population ranging from 1 to 12 million inhabitants. It consists 
of municipalities with local governments as the administrative bodies. 
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Figure 3: Public Health Expenditure Index in Constant Prices in Russia, 1991–2015 
 
Source: Shishkin et al, 2016. 
The rise and fall in health spending was underpinned by key macroeconomic trends. In the early 1990s, 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, radical change in the political system, and a move from central planning 
to a market economy was associated with a sharp contraction of the Russian economy. The economic 
downturn of the 1990s was relatively short-lived, with a recovery underway in the 2000s.4 Between 2000 
and 2013, GDP rose 5.2 percent on average annually, above the 4.5 percent regional mean for ECA. The 
trend was interrupted only by the 2008–09 crisis, when GDP declined by approximately 7.8 percent, but 
thereafter resumed quickly. GDP per capita nearly doubled between 2000 and 2012 (from US$8,613 to 
US$15,177 in purchasing power parity, PPP, 2005 terms). For much of the 2000s, buoyant oil revenues 
accounting for about 25 percent of total revenue boosted public spending and allowed for a steady increase 
in public employment, wages, pensions, and transfers. Total general government spending as a share of 
GDP rose from 32.8 to 38.2 percent from 2000 to 2013. However, growth decelerated since 2012 due to 
binding structural constraints (high wages and consumption-driven growth with limited investment 
spending) and external worsening conditions (a fall in oil prices and economic sanctions). These factors 
resulted in lower government revenues and decreasing public health spending.  
The increase in fiscal space for health was due to increased outlays from federal and regional 
government revenues. During 2000-2014, the share of SHI contributions (paid for by employers and 
regional government revenues) and federal government revenues in total public spending on health 
increased substantially relative to local government revenues (almost zero in 2014) (Annex Table 1 and 
Annex Table 2). The structure of public health expenditure is increasingly based on SHI allocations. The 
government has initiated the process of shifting to a “one-channel” model that pools budgetary and SHI 
revenue in SHI Funds. SHI expenditure as a percent of total public health expenditure increased from 34 
percent in 2000 to 54 percent in 2014 (Figure 4).  
                                                          
4 World Bank, 2016. Russia SCD report 
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Figure 4: Share of SHI Expenditure in Russia, 1991-2015, % 
 
    Budgetary expenditure      SHI  
Source: Shishkin et al, 2016 
Russia has a complex system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers with the Federal SHI Fund responsible 
for the equalization of allocations. SHI contributions are pooled in the Federal SHI Fund and then allocated 
to the 85 Regional SHI Funds through a subsidy mechanism (“subventions”) that equalizes health funding 
across regions. The richer regions contribute proportionately more than they receive. They can also 
contribute directly to their SHI Funds in addition to the centrally specified size of contribution, thereby 
resulting in more generous SHI programs in terms of per capita expenditure. In addition to the SHI 
contribution, there are direct transfers from the Federal to regional budgets – both general and earmarked 
for health. These allocations take into account the fiscal capacity of the region. The bulk of the 
intergovernmental transfers are within the SHI system, however. The Federal SHI Fund revenue is the major 
source of equalization. Its subsidies to regions amount to 94% of intergovernmental transfers for health. 
The regional equalization policy was initiated in 2011. This has led to a substantial decrease in the variation 
of per capita health funding across regions. The ratio of the revenue of the richest and the poorest regional 
SHI Funds dropped to 1.9 in 2015 from 4.2 in 2010 (Shishkin et al, 2016). 
The majority of public funding goes towards the PSG, which consists of two components: the basic SHI 
program and the package of benefits funded directly from budgetary sources. The budgetary component 
is allocated for public health, infectious diseases, mental health, AIDS, a portion of tertiary care (most of it 
is funded by SHI), outpatient drugs for a relatively small group of beneficiaries (around 10 percent of the 
population) and other relatively minor items. PSG absorbs around 70 percent of public health expenditure 
and is the main health coverage program (HCP) for the purposes of this UNICO Case Study. In addition, 
there are nation-wide general and disease-specific programs funded mostly from the federal budget with 
some regional budget input. National health programs are supplemented through regional program 
funding. Both national and regional health programs cover the bulk of investment expenditure.   
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OOP spending is dominated by outpatient drugs, which are not adequately covered by the PSG. Only 10 
percent of the Russian population has some outpatient drug coverage, with the rest paying OOP. The public 
sector’s share of total drug expenditure is 11 percent in Russia, compared to 48 percent in the EU. It is 
lower than that in most of post-Soviet countries (except for Moldova) – 31 percent in Belarus, 34 percent 
in Lithuania and 63 percent in Czech Republic (WHO database, 2015). Figure 5 shows the breakdown of 
total government and OOP spending by type of provider.  
Figure 5: Breakdown of Health Spending by Source and Provider, 2014 
 
Notes: Total government includes SHI and budgetary allocations. The breakdown of total OOP spending by 
outpatient and inpatient care is the authors’ estimates as it is not available from the original source. 
Source: Flek O. Russian Health Finance based on health accounting system. Moscow, 2015, pp.27, 28, 37-39. 
Health insurers are the purchasers of health care in principle.  The health insurers – 67 in total - receive 
funding from Regional SHI Funds based on an age/sex-adjusted capitation formula, contract providers, 
reimburse the contracted providers for the services provided and are responsible for the health care quality 
control. There are 3-6 insurers in each region, each one with its own enrollees. The system was designed 
to be a “regulated competition model”, but in practice competition between insurers is quite limited. The 
health insurers compete mostly on customer services rather than price and product (insurance plans). 
Consumer choice is not supplemented by “price signals” like premiums or co-payment. In each region, the 
Commission on the State Guarantees of Free Care plans and negotiates care for the entire region and 
specific providers.5  This Commission acts as the actual purchaser of care with little direct input from health 
insurers. Contracts with providers formalize the Commission’s decisions. In short, the health insurers’ role 
as purchasers is quite limited.  
                                                          
5Consists of representatives of the Regional SHI Fund, regional and local health authorities, medical associations and 
health insurers. 
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Providers are paid on a capitation basis for outpatient care and case-based payment for inpatient care. 
Case-based payment is based on Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs)6. DRGs were initially introduced for 320 
clinically related groups and have been rolled out nationally over the past five years.  
The public sector is the main provider of health services. Private sector services are growing but primarily 
provide outpatient services. A limited number of private providers participate in the PSG through contracts 
with health insurers. Private facilities account for 19.9 percent of all SHI contracts, and about 10 percent 
of all outpatient care paid for by SHI. The private sector’s role in secondary and tertiary care is even smaller 
(Annex Table 3). 
 
4. Supply and Delivery of Health Care 
Public health was historically the cornerstone of primary care efforts in Russia. Regular check-ups and 
screening activities for the working population and teenagers have been growing under a nation-wide 
program of “dispanserization” (screenings and check-ups), and child immunization programs. Treatment 
and control of tuberculosis, child acute respiratory infections and diabetes are examples of services 
provided in primary care settings.  These programs as well as separate environmental health and 
communicable disease surveillance programs are fully financed by government revenues with no cost-
sharing by users. 
Primary health care is provided in multi-specialty policlinics in urban areas and smaller settings in rural 
areas. District physicians serve children and adults separately, with many primary care functions being 
delegated to specialists working with district physicians, because the cadre of general practitioners has not 
been sufficiently developed. Secondary and tertiary care is provided in a hierarchy of hospitals at the 
federal, regional and local level.  
The traditional role of district physicians7 (DP) as gatekeepers is on the decline. In many regions of the 
country, especially Moscow city, patients can visit a DP or see specialists without a referral. DPs are typically 
not aware of their patients’ hospital admissions and ambulance calls as coordination between primary 
health care (PHC) physicians, outpatient specialists and hospitals is low. Chronic disease management is 
weak as a consequence (Sheiman, Shevski, 2014). The role of the DP has been undermined due to shortages 
as well as perceived lack of quality.  The number of patients per DP ranges from 2300 to 3300 across 
                                                          
6 DRGs classify patient cases according to the following variables: principal and secondary diagnoses, patient age and 
sex, the presence of co-morbidities and complications and the procedures performed. Cases classified as belonging 
to a particular DRG are characterized by a homogenous resource consumption pattern and, at the same time, DRGs 
are clinically meaningful. Thus, cases within the same DRG are economically and medically similar. 
7 District physicians (DPs) and general practitioners (GPs) are quite distinct in the Russian context. There are two types 
of DPs – district therapists serve adults; district pediatricians serve children. The major difference between DPs and 
GPs is that the former has a much narrower clinical area and deal with the simpler internal medicine cases, while GPs 
provide more comprehensive care that includes some clinical specialist areas. According to federal “normatives”, GPs 
are responsible for 1200 people (some of them children), while district therapists – 1700 adults, and district 
pediatricians -  800 children.  Russia is slowly developing a cadre of GPs.  
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regions, which is 70-100 percent higher than the target (“normative” level) established by the MOH 
(Shishkin et al, 2016). As a result, waiting times to see the DP are long in some regions, while visit times are 
short and the scope of services offered is limited. Also, patients’ satisfaction with DP services is low. 
According to the Roszdravnadzor (an agency reporting to the Ministry of Health), only 14 percent of 
respondents were satisfied with their DPs (Sheiman, Shevski, 2014). The latest survey of the Levada Center 
(the biggest sociological organization in Russia) revealed similar mistrust: 44 percent of respondents are 
dissatisfied with the short visit-times at polyclinics; 63 percent dissatisfied with the inadequate 
qualification of polyclinics physicians and their shortage (Levada Center, 2016).  Similar estimates made for 
European countries (including some post-Soviet countries) indicate that 80-90 percent of respondents are 
satisfied with their general practitioner (GPs) (Wilson et al, 2015).  
Government programs have sought to strengthen rural primary care in recent years, but have yet to 
make a significant impact. Physicians receive a lump sum compensation for housing costs as an incentive 
to relocate to rural areas. Although initially successful, the impact of the program has waned: the number 
of participants in the program fell from 7,693 physicians in 2012 to 3,313 in 2014. Despite a shortage of 
rural physicians, medical facilities have received new medical equipment and the “feldsher-midwife units” 
(staffed with paramedics) re-vitalized. Furthermore, the rural population now has better access to specialty 
care provided in “inter-territorial” health centers, medical facilities that serve the population of a group of 
sub-regional areas. The distance that patients need to travel to seek acute medical care has been shortened 
as a result.  
The Ministry of Health has also initiated a set of activities to strengthen primary care in remote areas. 
New information systems have shown that there are 82,000 locations where the number of households is 
less than 100. New communication devices are being provided for these areas, households requiring access 
to services identified and mobile medical teams formed to carry out regular check-ups and respond quickly 
to urgent health needs (MOH, 2016).   
However, primary care remains the weakest aspect of health service delivery resulting in an over-
reliance on hospitals. Under-provision of primary care generates demand for specialty care and 
exacerbates an already high reliance on hospitals. The perception that high quality health care can only be 
received in inpatient care settings is deeply rooted in the population. Although the number of bed-days 
per capita has declined due to government efforts to shift care from inpatient to outpatient care, this 
indicator remains 70-75 percent higher than for other EU countries.  
Tertiary care is more centralized than primary and secondary care and highly rationed. The MOH issues 
“quota” admissions for tertiary care (“high technology care”) and allocates them to regions. Regional 
health authorities in turn allocate them to medical facilities. Sometimes the quotas are allocated directly 
to providers.  Each application for tertiary care is assessed on a case-by-case basis. The number of quotas 
and the actual utilization of tertiary care increased substantially in 2008-2013 - due to substantial 
additional funding during this period.  
Most health personnel are public sector employees working in public facilities. The salary of physicians 
has increased, but in 2015 it was only 41 percent higher than the average salary in Russia (compared to 
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200-500 percent in Western Europe and the USA), while the salary of medical nurses is 21 percent lower 
than the average salary in Russia (Rosstat, 2016; OECD, 2015). This limits the motivation of health 
providers. 
Interactions with the Rest of the System 
Medical facilities owned by ministries other than the Ministry of Health and state corporations represent 
a parallel health system, although relatively small. Legally, regional health authorities are responsible for 
service provision in all regional medical facilities. The parallel health system exists independently with 
limited links to regional health authorities. Managers of territorial medical facilities report to the regional 
health authorities, while managers of health facilities in the parallel system report to their ministries and 
corporations. This complicates service delivery planning in the region and causes duplication. The enrollees 
of these systems do not lose access to the territorial health facilities (at the places of their residence) with 
the resulting double funding.  
Another area of interaction is the private health system. Private medical facilities provide services mostly 
for OOP payment. As mentioned above, they have limited involvement in the PSG. There are many 
administrative barriers, including:  i) low SHI tariffs, which are not adequate to cover the investment cost 
of private providers; ii) a legislative requirement not allowing the generation of profits from surplus 
revenues; iii) commitments by regional governments to increase the salaries of public facility employees.  
Economic Boom and Austerity: what it meant for the Supply of and Access to 
Health Services 
The boom years of 2000-2013 were associated with several important reforms to improve the 
accessibility and affordability of health services. The most significant increase in public expenditures 
occurred after 2006 when a large-scale National Priority Health Project was launched. This project focused 
on improving PHC and disease prevention, improving the accessibility of tertiary care and improving 
maternal and child health services. Over 250 polyclinics were built and more than 3000 repaired, and 1400 
feldsher-midwife units built (2000-2015). Resources were allocated to re-equip outpatient facilities so as 
to accelerate the shift of patients from inpatient to outpatient settings (MOH, 2016). Physicians were 
encouraged to work in rural areas with lump-sum housing costs compensation, which resulted in the 
number of rural physicians increasing by almost 25 percent from 2011 to 2016 (MOH, 2017).   
In 2008-2009, there was an added focus on reducing cardiovascular and cancer mortality, road traffic 
accident mortality and tuberculosis mortality. At this time, a previous focus on developing PHC and 
disease prevention was replaced by a greater emphasis on high-tech services. Fourteen new tertiary level 
federal medical centers specializing on cardio-vascular surgery, neurosurgery and trauma care were 
constructed improving access to high-tech services. Outpatient and emergency service facilities were re-
equipped with modern diagnostic medical equipment. The number of PHC physicians and nurses increased 
noticeably, which improved the accessibility of high-quality outpatient care in big cities and decreased 
waiting time for diagnostic procedures and ambulance response (Popovich et al, 2011). Another important 
investment initiative, the Health Care Modernization Program was implemented in 2011-2012 and focused 
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on modernizing health care infrastructure nationally at the regional level. Substantial new investments 
were made in equipment, medical supplies, major repair works, and building new child care facilities.  
The economic downturn and 2014-2016 budget cuts resulted in cost containment and attempts to more 
effectively use existing resources and maintain care guarantees. Currently, there are no plans to 
reconsider citizens’ entitlements to free care, as enshrined in the Russian constitution. Cost containment, 
which was always included in official documents as a key policy strategy has been strengthened through 
higher policy targets and additional activities.  The most important regulatory document is the Federal 
Government’s roadmap titled “Changes in the Social Sector to Enhance Efficiency” (December 28, 2012) 
and subsequent MOH regulations. Based on these, each region has developed a roadmap for increasing 
efficiency in the health sector through to 2018. The cost containment measures are described below.  
The government initiated a range of activities to promote healthy lifestyles. Primary care providers are 
increasingly involved in smoking and alcohol abuse cessation campaigns, as well as in encouraging healthy 
diets. There is some evidence of progress with MOH estimates of declines in alcohol sale from 10.7 liters 
per capita in 2011 to 8.7 in 2015. The share of smokers also declined from 35 percent of the adult 
population in 2014 to 31 percent in 2016 (Shishkin et al, 2017).   
Hospital services have been rationalized through reductions in beds and medical personnel. The number 
of public hospitals decreased by 9.3 percent, bed supply by 4.5 percent, the number of physicians by one 
percent, and nurses by 2.8 percent between 2013 and 2014 (Shishkin et al, 2016). Each region developed 
a road map to undertake further rationalization of services. For example, Moscow city reduced the number 
of hospital beds by 20 percent over the last 3 years. Patients are increasingly being moved to outpatient 
settings and day care centers.  
To meet the growing demand for outpatient care, polyclinics have been merged to create bigger entities. 
Initially, polyclinics were not ready to accept new patients due to shortages in physicians and their lack of 
qualifications to treat more complicated cases. Merging the polyclinics made it possible to spread scarce 
resources, particularly expensive equipment and specialists among a large group of enrollees, use them 
more intensively and save on administration costs. Since 2012, 452 city polyclinics in Moscow were 
consolidated into 46 outpatient centers for adult health care, each with a catchment area of 250,000-
300,000 enrollees. This reduced waiting time for patients, but increased travel time to services and further 
reduced the gatekeeping role of DPs.  
Efforts were also made to improve the remuneration of physicians and nurses, which have been largely 
successful. A Presidential decree in 2012 set an ambitious goal of increasing the average salary of 
physicians to 200 percent of the average national salary irrespective of region by 2018, and that of nurses 
and medical aids by 100 percent. Federal subsidies were provided to regions to help them achieve these 
targets and roadmaps developed with specific annual targets. The annual targets were met every year 
except in 2016, due to a difficult fiscal situation. This policy continues to be a political priority.  
The Russian population, in particular the poor, have not responded well to the public spending cuts. In 
the 2016 Levada Center Survey (2016), 50 percent of respondents reported no changes in access to care, 
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15 percent an improvement and 35 percent a deterioration. Among the poor, only 11 percent reported an 
improvement. 
Trends in the incidence of OOP payment in public facilities reflect overall economic trends and the 
dynamics of public health spending. According to the annual surveys of private health expenditure, in 2001 
52.8 percent of patients in hospitals paid formally and informally for drugs. This share declined to 18.3 
percent by 2012, but then went up to 22.1 percent in 2014. The share of patients who paid for physician 
visits was 8.5 percent in 2001 and 14.7 percent from 2012 until presently (Shishkin et al, 2016).  Per capita 
OOP spending is strongly positively correlated with per capita income and living in relatively “rich” cities, 
including Moscow and St. Petersburg, with most of the OOP increase during 2005–2012 concentrated in 
these cities (Shishkin, Potapchik and Selezneva 2014).  
 
5. Identification, Targeting and Beneficiary Enrolment 
Three-quarters of the population reported benefiting from some form of social protection through a 
myriad of federally mandated and regionally organized programs, though none of them specifically 
target the poor. The majority of the programs are not means tested. Most social assistance is allocated 
based on personal or household characteristics not related to income, such as subsidies for maternity, 
numerous children or disabilities. According to the surveys, only one-quarter of all beneficiaries belong to 
the bottom 20 percent of income, and they receive only one quarter of all resources allocated to social 
assistance (World Bank, 2016).  
There are no registries to identify the poor. The Ministry of Social Support administers a Targeting Registry 
for the disabled. For health care, each health insurer has its own Registry that is consolidated into a national 
one. The registry (federal and regional) of outpatient drug beneficiaries, identifies invalids, disabled, 
veterans and groups of population with some diseases covered by drug benefits.  However, neither targets 
the poor.  
To enroll in SHI, the individual must receive a SHI card (“policy”) of his/her enrollment, as well as the 
enrollment of their children. It is issued free of charge by a health insurer selected by the individual. 
Eligibility is guaranteed by the Constitution as described in the previous section. Failure to produce the SHI 
card does not result in the denial of services in case of an emergency.  
Primary care providers are required to enroll patients and may keep track of their health status, but are 
not required to take into account the socioeconomic status of their enrollees. To enroll with a primary 
health care provider, the individual must visit the primary health center and enroll with a district physician 
who serves a certain catchment area. If the individual is dissatisfied with the service of the DP or the entire 
center, s/he can enroll with another center and choose a DP once a year. DPs are expected to identify and 
enroll the most vulnerable groups, but not necessarily the poor.  In this way, DPs develop a register of 
patients in the catchment area that can be used to keep track of the health (e.g. chronically ill) status of 
patients. 
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The central government sets enrollment requirements. Federal and Regional SHI Funds check enrollment 
data and enter it into a universal SHI database. There is an electronic record of SHI transactions, which is 
monitored regionally and centrally. There is also a mechanism for cross-checking beneficiary databases 
with other databases for the purpose of determining if individuals are eligible for enrolment or for a 
subsidy. This is particularly relevant for the regions where PHC is paid on a capitation basis. The number of 
enrollees is compared with the number of residents in the catchment area – from the general regional 
database. 
Health insurers have individual data on each enrollee along with data on utilization and costs. They are 
responsible for claim verification, which includes identifying inappropriate hospital admissions, any under-
provision of services, as well as other sources of inefficiency in care provision.  According to the SHI Law, 
insurers can retain 10 percent of savings (insurers’ revenue less actual health care payment) and therefore 
have incentives to register patients and monitor their utilization of care.  
 
6. Management of Public Funds under the PSG 
The PSG has been associated with efforts to strengthen the planning of service delivery and finance, as 
well as to improve incentives for providers. Direct administration of medical facilities and item-based 
funding have given way to changes in the way in which providers are contracted and paid. The most 
important changes are as follows. 
(1) The PSG has been associated with a shift from resource-based to utilization-based planning of service 
delivery. The main mechanism is to set up utilization targets that encourage a shift of care from inpatient 
to outpatient facilities, greater use of day care centers, shorter hospital length of stay, more tough 
requirements for admission, etc. In the first PSG issued in 1998 the plan was to decrease the number of 
bed-days from 3.6 to 2.8 bed-days per capita over 5-7 years. This target has now been reached.   The targets 
serve as the benchmark for planning utilization and finance for individual providers. These and further 
planning developments save resources for the UHC. Nevertheless, as noted above, Russia still has a much 
higher inpatient care utilization rate than other EU countries. 
(2) New provider payment methods have been introduced – capitation for outpatient care and DRG-method 
for inpatient care. The focus on prospective payment methods is designed to ensure predictability of 
utilization and finance, and thereby to increase the sustainability of the PSG. Capitation methods (including 
the fundholding scheme) are designed to encourage disease prevention, decrease unnecessary patients 
visits, strengthen integration between inpatient and outpatient care, as well as minimize financial risks of 
PHC providers (Sheiman, 2016). The use of DRG-based payment methods has made inpatient care more 
intensive and decreased the share of less complex cases that could be treated in outpatient settings. These 
methods require further development to contribute to cost control and make patients entitlements 
effective. 
(3) The PSG presumes a shift to performance-based salaries over time. The concept of an “effective 
contract” with health workers was introduced in 2012.  This dismantled all former administrative barriers 
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to improving health work performance – without any limits on the level of salary. Health authorities and 
managers have developed a set of performance indicators for health workers and contracted them based 
on performance against these indicators. The effective contract is regarded as a tool to encourage the best 
medical workers and fire those that do not match the performance targets.  
(4) The PSG has improved the portability of health insurance and allowed “money to follow patients” 
irrespective of their place of residence and the status of providers. Local providers now serve patients from 
other areas, military and police medical facilities accept civil patients and provide free care. With all the 
limitations mentioned above, this development has strengthened medical benefit implementation and 
encouraged patient choice. 
(5) The financial management of medical facilities under social health insurance is more flexible. The 
requirements of item-by-item resource allocation are not so strict as in the framework of the usual 
budgetary funding. Health managers have more discretion regarding financial decisions, although the 
heritage of the past command-and-control system still remains (Shishkin, 2016).     
 
7. Management of the Benefit Package under the PSG 
The PSG sets the following parameters with regard to how the benefits package is defined (Government, 
2015): 
1. List of diseases: almost all diseases in International Classification of Diseases are included; 
treatment is free of charge. 
2. Types of services: primary care, specialist outpatient care, day care centers services, ambulance 
care, rehabilitation care, palliative care, specialist inpatient care; treatment is free of charge. 
3. List of high technology care: includes only elective care. Tertiary care is explicitly rationed.   
4. Waiting time limits: primary care provided by district physicians – within 24 hours; consultations 
by outpatient specialists – not more than 14 days; instrumental diagnostics and lab tests – 14 days; 
computer tomography and MRT – 30 days; ambulance care – 20 minutes after registration of a call; 
high technology care (tertiary care) – 30 days. 
5. Drugs: list of outpatient drug beneficiaries and list of essential drugs are specified. 
6. Utilization targets for each type of care (see above sections). 
7. Funding per capita and unit cost target (normative) for each type of care. 
8. Criteria of health care quality: 25 criteria for the individual types of care.    
Items (6)-(8) are included for planning purposes and for the evaluation of the PSG. They broaden the 
prospective for state commitments beyond the area of benefits package specification.  
The coverage of medical services in the PSG is quite comprehensive. Most of services are provided free 
of charge, in principle. Only minor services are not included, e.g. check-ups for driving license, some 
diagnostic tests. Services provided without prior referrals are subject to OOP payments. 
The coverage of drugs is much less comprehensive. The major outpatient drug program covers 13.7 million 
people – invalids, disabled, veterans, etc. They are entitled to free outpatient drugs in accordance with the 
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list of essential drugs. Beneficiaries can choose the actual drug provision or a fixed amount of money 
(benefits in kind vs. benefits in cash). Only 3.7 million beneficiaries have chosen the drug option because 
of the fear of drug unavailability in the pharmacies (2.5 percent of population). Another federal program 
covers the cost of outpatient drugs used for treatment of 24 rare and quickly progressing chronic diseases.  
Although the PSG benefits package is uniform across the whole population in principle, in practice there 
is quite a lot of variation across regions in terms of how much is actually spent on the PSG package 
available to beneficiaries. Richer regions increase coverage of outpatient drugs by increasing the number 
of beneficiaries covered by the drug programs, or by expanding the list of reimbursable drugs. Since the 
overall cost of the program is higher in richer regions, these regions can also accommodate higher tariffs 
for medical services and thus reduce the amount of cost sharing that takes place. In short, although the 
PSG benefits package is comprehensive and universal by definition, in practice there is a lot of explicit and 
implicit rationing that takes place. Richer regions are able to spend more and thus have less of both forms 
of rationing.  
The scope of the benefit package has changed little since the first PSG was issued in 1998. The major 
changes introduced were: i) a longer list and higher utilization targets for tertiary care, ii) some extension 
of outpatient drug coverage and new beneficiaries, iii) inclusion of rehabilitation and palliative care, iv) 
specification of the waiting time limits. Utilization targets (per capita) have different vectors: upward for 
tertiary care, services in day care centers, rehabilitation and palliative care; downward for inpatient care; 
stable for PHC and ambulance care (Flek, 2015). These targets determine the process of service 
restructuring and must be followed by the regions.     
The main problem with the package of medical benefits in Russia is that it is not specified clearly enough. 
The commitments of the government are aggregate in nature in that medical benefits are determined in 
terms of diseases and types of care across aggregates of medical interventions. Tariffs are also set mostly 
for these aggregates. The specific diagnostic tests, drugs, implants and curative procedures that are to be 
provided are not always clear.   
Recent efforts to specify benefits more precisely include the development of clinical standards, patterns 
of medical care and clinical guidelines for each disease. The standard is a list of drugs and services, as well 
as the frequency of their use, for example, computerized tomography (CT) as a diagnostic device is needed 
for a certain percentage of cases. The pattern of medical care sets requirements for procurement and 
staffing for each specialty. The clinical guidelines are supposed to establish algorithms of service provision. 
The latter is seen as the major clinical benchmark for providers. Currently, there are 1200 clinical guidelines 
covering 90 percent of most common diseases (MOH, 2016).    
The choice of what to include/exclude from the package is made by the top physicians in every clinical 
area with the involvement of medical associations. The decision-making process is not explicit. Neither 
are there regulations to define how a choice is made nor any efforts to compare clinical and/cost-
effectiveness of different interventions. Therefore, the choice of specific reimbursable drugs, implants, 
medical services, as well as the list of tertiary care is not substantiated by clinical and/or economic analysis.  
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Clinical standards, patterns and guidelines have not added much to the expected benefits specification. 
First, they don’t cover some common diseases. Second, they are highly disputed by various groups of 
medical profession. Third and most important, they are not linked to available financial resources and 
therefore often unrealistic. This is particularly true for the patterns of medical care. They establish expected 
requirements to resources per case. For example, a physician of a certain specialty is supposed to have 10-
15 cases (hospital beds) rather than the current 20-25 cases, which is unrealistic with the human resources 
availability. Standards often propose high frequency expensive clinical tests and interventions, which are 
impossible to provide in regions with low financial capacity.  
These initiatives have established a growing understanding of the need for better management of the 
benefits package.  A recent amendment to the drug procurement Law introduces the concept of the 
“complex analysis” of clinical and economic characteristics of reimbursable drugs. Also, a special unit has 
been set up in the MOH for the clinical and economic evaluation of medical benefits. The initial data 
generated relates to the evaluation of drugs and not medical services.   
 
8. Taking Stock: PSG’s Impact on Progress towards UHC 
This section takes a closer look at what Russia’s universal approach to expanding coverage has meant 
for the poor. As economic growth and revenues improved during the 2000s, Russia embarked on a 
significant expansion of health care coverage through the implementation of the PSG. After 2013, the 
economic crisis resulted in expenditure cuts and some rationalization of health services. Nevertheless, even 
before these expenditure cuts, the benefits package was not fully financed leading to some implicit service 
rationing. This section describes the impact the PSG had on Russia’s progress towards UHC, particularly in 
the context of a tightening fiscal situation.  
The PSG is a universal program with a single national pool and a uniform benefits package that all citizens 
of Russia are entitled to under the Constitution. Neither SHI enrollment nor access to services is linked to 
the socioeconomic status of the beneficiaries. Employers pay contributions on behalf of their employees 
and the government pays contributions on behalf of the non-working population regardless of their 
socioeconomic status. The benefits package is quite comprehensive, particularly with regard to medical 
services, with all regions expected to make them available to beneficiaries. There has never been any 
explicit targeting of services, although there has been an element of geographic targeting: fiscal 
redistribution was used to improve resource allocation to less well-off regions and rural areas. The political 
commitment to universal coverage was maintained through the recent economic crises. 
In practice, a combination of underfunding in health care (Section 2), the lack of clarity over the benefits 
package (Section 7) and an inadequate focus on the poor (Section 5) has given rise to inequity and implicit 
rationing of health care. Major forms of implicit rationing in Russia include: inadequate access to good 
quality primary care services and effective coordination of care; limited availability and affordability of 
drugs and supplies; and the opportunistic behavior of physicians, who typically offer the most effective 
drugs and services only for OOP payment.  
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This section first presents the quantitative evidence on equity and financial protection from 2000 to 2015 
before examining some qualitative evidence on how the poor are affected by implicit rationing in the health 
sector. 
Quantitative Evidence regarding Financial Protection and Equity 
Financial protection improved significantly as the PSG was rolled out: rates of catastrophic OOP spending 
declined quite dramatically in the late 1990s, then more gradually and rose only slightly following 
expenditure cuts. Data reveals that Russians were significantly less likely to forego care because of financial 
barriers to access in 2011 compared to 2000 (Shishkin, Potapchik and Selezneva 2014). In 1997, four 
percent of all households spent more than 10 percent of their total household spending on health 
payments (Figure 6). This share declined to 1.8 percent by 2010, but rose again to 2.4 percent in 2014 
following reductions in public health spending. The recent UHC Global Monitoring Report shows that 
catastrophic incidence in Russia is comparable to that of many OECD countries at the 10 and 25 percent 
thresholds (WHO and World Bank, 2017). Figure 7 shows catastrophic incidence at the 25 percent threshold 
across the world for the most recent year available. Russian data reveal that catastrophic spending was 
concentrated amongst richer households, and increasingly so during the 2000s (Annex 2, Table A2.1).  The 
percentage of households pushed below the poverty line as a result of OOP payments has been declining 
as well, though there was a slight increase in 2014. Annex 2 contains a more detailed description of this 
analysis and results.  
Figure 6: Catastrophic Health Payments as a Percent of Total Consumption 
 
Source: World Bank analysis of Household Budget Surveys for Russia for 1997-2004 and 2010-2012. 
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Figure 7: Global Incidence of Catastrophic Health Spending 
 
Notes: WHO and World Bank estimates are based on standard definitions and methods to ensure cross-country 
comparability, which may not correspond to the methods used at regional and/or national level to monitor 
catastrophic spending on health. Global estimates are based on data availability for global monitoring which may not 
necessarily align with availability of data at national or regional levels.  
Source: Global database on financial protection assembled by WHO and the World Bank (WHO and the World Bank, 
2017). 
 
Underlying these improvements were large reductions in OOP spending on inpatient care, particularly 
by the poor and those living outside of Moscow and St. Petersburg.  Per capita OOP expenditures on 
inpatient care declined by 1.6 times from 2000 to 2012, and the share of patients purchasing drugs OOP 
for inpatient care declined from 52.8 percent to 18.3 percent. Notably, the ratio of per capita inpatient 
OOPs of the richest quintile to the poorest quintile doubled during the same period, indicating that those 
expenditures are now more concentrated among the rich (Shishkin, Potapchik and Selezneva 2014), 
consistent with the above finding that catastrophic spending is concentrated among richer population 
groups. With the exception of those living in Moscow and St. Petersburg, per capita inpatient OOP spending 
declined for all others reflecting the increase in free, albeit often low quality inpatient care services and 
drugs.  
Large increases in OOP spending on outpatient drugs and services, particularly for the poor weakened 
financial protection. As shown earlier in Figure 5, expenditures at pharmacies dominates OOP spending. 
OOP spending on outpatient drugs, which are not included in the state guaranteed benefits package 
increased three-fold during 2000-2012 after adjusting for prices, while the share of patients who paid for 
outpatient care increased from 4 percent (1994) to 9 percent (2000) and 15 percent (2012) (Shishkin, 
Potapchik and Selezneva 2014). Outpatient drugs accounted for 61.4 percent of total OOP spending, while 
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outpatient and inpatient drugs accounted for 32.3 percent and 6.3 percent respectively. The rate of growth 
in outpatient OOP spending was higher for the poor than for the rich.  
Spending on diagnostic tests and services declined only for those living in big cities. The share of those 
who paid for tests and medical procedures during outpatient care increased from 8.8 percent in 1994 to 
27.4 percent in 2006 and declined thereafter.  This decline was a direct consequence of improved public 
investment to increase the supply of modern diagnostic equipment in outpatient care facilities. However, 
the fact that per capita OOP spending on diagnostic services declined by 30 percent for those in big cities 
but increased for everyone else indicates that the residents of large cities may have been the primary 
beneficiaries of all of the increased diagnostic equipment investments.  
Given these trends in financial protection, it is no surprise that the use of inpatient care became more 
pro-poor and outpatient care more pro-rich (Figure 8 and Figure 9) particularly for those aged 65 years 
and over. Inpatient utilization rates increased from 3.6 percent to 4.9 percent for the poorest quintile, but 
declined from 5.6 percent to 4.6 percent for the richest. Inpatient utilization rates for the poorest quintile 
increased from 4.6 percent to 8.8 percent for those over 65. Greater use of inpatient care services by the 
elderly may reflect increased financial barriers to accessing outpatient care. As shown in Figure 9, there 
has been little change in the distribution of use of outpatient services.   For those aged 65 and over, 
outpatient use has become more pro-rich. The data also suggest that recent utilization rate increases are 
more pronounced in the big cities.  
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Figure 8: Utilization Rate of Inpatient Care Services during the Past Three Months by Socioeconomic 
Status, Area of Residence and Age, 2000-2014 
 
Source: World Bank analysis of Russia Living Standards Measurement Surveys for 2000 and 2014. 
Notes: (1) Q1 to Q5 refer to consumption based quintiles calculated using household consumption reported in the 
survey with Q1 being the poorest and Q4 the richest. (2) Big cities have a population of over 500,000 and Other 
Cities have a population of 50,000 – 500,000 
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Figure 9: Probability of Having Seen a Doctor During the Past Three Months, by Socioeconomic Status, 
Area of Residence and Age, 2000-2014 
 
Source: World Bank analysis of Russia Living Standards Measurement Surveys for 2000 and 2014. 
Notes: The outcome variable is the probability of having seen a doctor in the past three months without being sick. 
This was the only outpatient care variable for which comparable multi-year data was available. 
Q1 to Q5 refer to consumption-based quintiles calculated using household consumption reported in the survey with 
Q1 being the poorest and Q4 the richest. 
Big cities have a population of over 500,000 and other cities have a population of 50,000 – 500,000 
 
Qualitative Evidence on the Impact of Implicit Rationing 
Primary care providers - DPs and GPs - are in short supply (Section 3) and do not play a major role in the 
coordination of care. DPs refer roughly one-third of their first contact patients to specialists (Sheiman, 
Shevski, 2014), compared to 8-15 percent or lower in the EU. An internet survey of 171 DPs and GPs in 14 
regions of Russia conducted in mid-2016 by the Higher School of Economics (HSE, 2016) collected data on 
actual practice of primary care providers in Russia. It followed a set of indicators included in the European 
Primary Care Activity Monitor in 31 European countries (Kringos et al, 2015) and provided the following 
evidence on the extent of under-provision in primary care:  
➢ DPs do not provide adequate follow-up care to patients after hospital discharges. The survey 
indicated that 63 percent of DPs are unaware of their patients’ hospital admissions. The lack of 
continuity of care is particularly a problem in the case of strokes, myocardial infarctions, and major 
trauma. Similarly, most DPs are unaware of their patients’ ambulance calls, which is an indirect 
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indication of poor chronic case management. A patient with a stroke is supposed to have 
rehabilitative care (a PSG provision) after discharge, but in many cases, this is not the case.  
➢ There is little interaction between primary care providers and outpatient specialists in the 
management of chronic diseases. Only 27 percent of respondents reported having regular 
discussions of chronic cases with specialists, 30 percent never, and 43 percent - rarely. Primary 
care providers choose how they refer patients to specialists, communicate with them and provide 
feedback from specialists. 
Chronic disease management is rationed. Patients with chronic diseases are entitled to “dispensary 
surveillance”, or case management by the joint effort of district physicians and specialists. But the scope 
of these services is limited. According to a group of leading cardio-surgeons, chronic disease management 
covers only 10 percent of myocardial infarction cases, 23 percent of instable cardiac angina cases, and 43.6 
percent with ischemic heart disease. The target outcomes of chronic disease management are not specified 
(Bokeria et al, 2015, p. 70). 
The PSG specifies waiting time limits for elective inpatient care, but there is no requirement for hospitals 
to make waiting time information for specific interventions publicly available. Also, there are no explicit 
waiting list management procedures. This extends the scope for implicit rationing: elective medical 
interventions may be postponed until a patient seeks the same care with private payment (sometimes in 
the same hospital). 
Since the PSG does not specify exactly which diagnostic and curative care services beneficiaries are 
eligible for, providers have discretion over providing or denying tests and procedures depending on 
budget availability. For example, an X-ray may be provided instead of a CT scan for a complex case of back 
pain even though the CT scan may be the more clinically appropriate option. Instead, the CT exam may be 
offered subject to private payment.  According to the HSE survey (2015), 62 percent of patients who paid 
for diagnostic services in 2014 did so because they could not get these services free of charge, 15 percent 
did so because access to the service was difficult or impossible without paying. 
The most common form of implicit rationing is to shift the cost of the service to the user. A media report 
found that payments are almost always required for several tests even though, in principle, they are 
provided free of charge under the PSG. These tests include thyroid function tests (thyrotrophic hormone, 
T3, T4), a series of massages or remedial gymnastics prescribed by specialists (especially for children), 
additional physiotherapy (for example: electrophoresis is free but not high-frequency therapy, ultraviolet 
irradiation, or similar), and Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) or CT (which have waiting times of close to 
1-2 months instead of 3-4 days).  Users also often have to purchase additional supplies for the surgical 
trauma treatment and bone or muscular diseases (for instance, surgical hardware or endoprothesis), 
intraocular lens prior to cataract surgery, pay for the initial care visit to a dermatologist, anesthesia (for 
example: in dentistry), and tooth removal (Moskovski Komsomolets, September 19, p 6). 
In a large country with a highly-dispersed population, it is inevitable that the population in remote areas 
faces barriers to access. The Levada center survey showed that in mid-2016, 40 percent of rural residents 
had not seen a doctor over the previous two years, while the national average was 32 percent, and 19 
percent for Moscow. Among rural residents, 40 percent cite long waiting times as a major cause of under-
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provision, 35 percent low physician qualifications and 35 percent poor medical facility equipment. Urban 
area residents cite poor physician qualifications as the major access obstacle (Levada Center, 2016, pp. 
12,15). Also, there is a substantial gap in the physicians/population ratio in rural and urban areas (Rosstat, 
2016).  
On a more positive note, informal payments, which are often associated with implicit rationing have 
declined in recent years.  The 2012 HSE survey showed that of those who paid any OOP payments, 66.2 
percent paid informally for inpatient care and 28.1 percent paid informally for outpatient care. The average 
share of informal payments was around 30 percent of total OOP. Patients pay for access to care in the best 
medical facilities, treatment by the best physicians, amenities and sometimes for drugs and supplies that 
are unavailable or scarce in medical facilities. “Gratitude payments” are also common, particularly for 
maternity cases and major surgery. However, economic development resulted in a legalization of a certain 
portion of informal payments, both over time and across regions. There has been a reduction in their 
frequency and their value as a share of total OOP (Shishkin, Potapchik and Selezneva 2014, p.8). 
Drug Coverage 
Users bear the bulk of the drug costs because of weak PSG drug coverage. This is particularly true for the 
elderly, although some are beneficiaries of the drug program. According to the Russia Longitudinal 
Monitoring surveys, the retired spend 2.2 times more on drugs than the employed in per capita terms 
(Shishkin et al, 2014, p. 20). This also explains why the elderly poor are less likely to use outpatient care 
services than the rich (Figure 9).  
The Accounting Chamber (a major Russian control agency) recently provided evidence on the under-
provision of oncological care drugs relative to the list of drugs established by the regional programs of 
state guarantees.  Some regional drug program beneficiaries in Stavropol, Kaliningrad, Moscow, Tomsk 
oblasts, Moscow city have been denied the oncological drugs. The major reason is unavailability of these 
drugs in pharmacies and hospitals. Formal prosecution of the health authorities in the cases identified but 
the Accounting Chamber has started (Evidence Medicine, 2016), though the actual number of drug denials 
is higher. 
Several options for extending outpatient drug coverage are under discussion. For example, Kirov oblast 
has set its own list of outpatient drugs for cardio-vascular diseases with a resulting decrease in inpatient 
care utilization per capita, less ambulance care calls by this group of patients, and reductions in mortality 
amongst the working age population. However, a nationwide scale-up of this program was postponed due 
to budgetary cuts.  
In addition, hospitals often ask patients to buy supplies for major medical equipment. Though 
documented evidence does not exist, interviews with Moscow hospital physicians indicate that requests 
for the purchase of medical equipment and required drugs are common in their clinical activity. 
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9. Conclusions 
Did Russia make Significant Progress towards UHC? 
An assessment of Russia’s progress towards UHC must use the status of the health sector in the early 
1990s as the starting point. The economic and political transformations of the early 1990s and the 
associated near collapse of the health sector resulted in a significant deterioration in health outcomes. 
Financial protection deteriorated considerably as health facilities increasingly relied on OOP financing. 
Although health outcomes improved during the 2000s, they continue to lag behind that of other 
comparator countries due to the tumultuous developments of the 1990s.  
The quantitative evidence presented in this paper suggests that Russia made important gains in 
improving financial protection and access to care for the poor, which were largely sustained through the 
economic crisis of the 2000s. Much of the improvement in financial protection occurred during the late 
1990s and early 2000s when rates of catastrophic spending and impoverishment due to OOPs declined 
dramatically.  Financial protection indicators deteriorated slightly following the economic crisis. Inpatient 
use became more pro-poor, especially for the elderly, but outpatient use more pro-rich.  Despite modest 
rates of improvement, these are significant when compared to the situation in the early 1990s.   
Large PSG related investments and reforms during the 2000s supported the achievement of health gains 
and moderated the reversal of trends during the fiscal crisis. The State’s commitment to universal 
coverage meant that explicit targeting was not considered. Given Russia’s federal governance structure, 
fiscal redistribution was used as a mechanism to increase resource allocation to less well-off areas. 
Increased public spending on hospital care, including capital investments, improved access to inpatient 
care for the poor, particularly the elderly. Increased investment in diagnostic equipment at outpatient care 
facilities was associated with increased access to diagnostic tests and services, but only in major cities. 
Limited PSG coverage for outpatient drugs means that high OOPs drug payments remain one of the biggest 
threats to financial risk protection. It has resulted in a deterioration in outpatient care access, particularly 
for the poor and elderly. There was, initially at least a strong push to reallocate spending towards primary 
care. This increased access to both physicians and services in remote, rural areas even if these trends were 
reversed later. Last, but not the least, informal payments declined as overall governance improved and 
health care payments were formalized.  
Pending Agenda 
To further deepen and expand coverage for the poor, there is a critical need to narrow the divergence 
between PSG’s de jure and actual coverage. This gap is largely due to resource constraints. Although the 
Federal PSG establishes requirements for the volume of care and their funding in the regions, some regions 
do not have the financial resources to provide all of those services. The Accounting Office reports funding 
shortages in 2016 of 937 million roubles in Pskovskay oblast, 703 million roubles in Altai Republic, and 468 
million roubles in Kaliningradskayoblast. Thus, the unit cost in these oblasts was 30-70 percent lower than 
federal financial targets (Evidence Medicine, 2016). These and other regions (not necessarily the poorest) 
cannot meet the federal funding targets despite the federal transfers they receive resulting in both explicit 
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and implicit rationing of services.  Higher OOP spending by richer households and those living in the large 
cities as well as other forms of implicit rationing discussed above suggest that public health spending is 
falling short of providing good quality, effective health care services to the population.  
Expanding outpatient drug coverage is a PSG priority. The lack of coverage of outpatient drugs in Russia 
is arguably the biggest barrier to improve both health outcomes for NCDs (given what we know about this 
from the West) and financial protection (given prominent role of drugs in OOP spending). To date, public 
health spending has focused on inpatient care, leaving households to pay for outpatient drugs, with 
potentially deleterious effects on outpatient care use by the poor and especially the older poor. Given rapid 
ageing and the high NCD burden, Russia needs to prioritize cost-effective approaches to addressing NCDs 
like the pharmacological treatment of cardiovascular disease and diabetes. The latter would require 
reducing the OOP cost of key outpatient drugs and strengthening access to good quality outpatient care 
services.  
Strengthening the service delivery system, particularly primary care, is important for sustaining and 
expanding recent financial protection and equity gains. The first important steps have been made by the 
Russian government for the rationalization of health infrastructure, including a shift from inpatient to 
outpatient care, deployment of day care centers, development of multi-level service delivery system, a 
substantial rise in tertiary care provision, establishment of a rehabilitation and palliative services sector 
and strengthening care in rural and remote areas. The equalization policy has helped re-distribute public 
spending more effectively. Historic supply variations across regions and local areas have narrowed due to 
a substantial improvement in access to care in some regions. The use of inpatient care has become more 
pro-poor, especially for those over 65 years of age.  However, service delivery reforms have fallen short of 
significantly strengthening primary care services.  Inadequate care coordination, chronic disease 
management and the over-use of hospital services are all associated with inadequate access to good 
quality, affordable primary care services.  
Several organizational changes are being tested in different regions in order to strengthen and transform 
the service delivery system. The objective is to make outpatient care more patient-oriented and increase 
efficiency of internal processes in polyclinics. For example, the current project “Resources saving 
polyclinics” being piloted in three regions (Jaroslavl, Kaliningrad oblasts and Sebastopol city) includes the 
following activities (MOH, 2017): i) delegation of some physicians’ functions to nurses; ii) building more 
efficient logistics in polyclinics, including a more careful separation of patient flows across individual 
providers’ offices; iii) introduction of electronic communication and paper work reduction; iv) building a 
new polyclinic image; and v) establishing new infrastructure for preventive activities (new structural units). 
Two years of project implementation (2015-2016) have shown promising results. According to the MOH 
(2017), physicians’ average time with patients doubled in these regions, appointments with physicians 
were radically facilitated, and patient waiting times to see a physician fell by 12 times. More detailed 
evidence of the project’ results will become available in future.  Another example is the creation of a new 
“layer” – inter-territorial health center – to supplement the traditional model of outpatient care. This layer 
will provide both outpatient and inpatient care to the inhabitants of a few neighboring territories. The 
regional governments built these centers for clusters of communities to encourage the cross-border 
movement of patients.   
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Going forward, additional fiscal space for health is needed and health policy must make more effective 
use of available resources. An increase in tobacco and alcohol taxes would not only raise revenue, if 
earmarked for the health sector, but also reduce tobacco and alcohol consumption, which contributes to 
NCDs. Once the additional fiscal space has been identified, expanding coverage for outpatient drugs and 
strengthening primary care are immediate priorities.   
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Annex 1: Supplementary Tables 
Annex Table 1. Public Health Funding Structure by Revenue Source in Russia in 2000-2014, % 
 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Federal  8.8 22.7 26.5 21.7 
Regional 23.9 21.0 25.8 24.8 
Local 26.9 21.2 14.7 1.2 
SHI Funds* 40.4 35.1 32.9 52.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 (2620 bln 
roubles) 
* Includes contributions of regional governments to SHI for the non-working population 
Source: Flek, 2015, p.114 
 
Annex Table 2. Public Health Funding Structure by Financial Agents in Russia in 2000-2014, % 
 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Federal  8.8 15.7 19.2 17.57 
Regional 24.1 21.1 31.9 28.2 
Local 26.9 21.2 14.7 1.22 
SHI Funds* 40.4 42.0 34.2 53.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
* Includes SHI contributions for the non-working population 
Source: estimate based on Flek, 2015, p. 115. 
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Annex Table 3: Public/Private Mix by Level of Service Provision in Russia 
 Public Private Comments 
Primary Care (number 
of consultations) 
Large 
(around 
90%) 
Small 
(around 
10%) 
Private outpatient facilities 
(practically all for-profit) participate 
in the implementation of the State 
Guarantees of Free Care through 
health insurer contracts. Their share 
in the total number of medical 
facilities under SHI contracts 
amounts to 19.9% (FOMS, 2015, p.7).  
But the share in volumes of care is 
much lower, as most of them are 
small organizations (much smaller 
than public polyclinics). These are 
our estimates since exact data is not 
available.   
Secondary care 
(number of bed-days) 
Large 
(90-
95%) 
Small (5-
10%) 
Private hospitals are rare in Russia. 
Our estimate relates to the hospitals 
owned by a few of the biggest 
corporations and private entities. 
Tertiary Care (number 
of bed-days) 
Large 
(95-
98%) 
Small 3-
5%) 
Private hospitals are rare in Russia. 
Our estimate relates to the hospitals 
owned by a few of the biggest 
corporations and private entities. 
Source: Authors estimates 
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Annex 2: Measuring Financial Protection in Russia 
Measures of Financial Protection relate OOP to a Threshold.  
Catastrophic Health Expenditures 
One approach is to classify spending as ‘catastrophic’ if it exceeds a certain fraction of household income 
or consumption or nonfood consumption. Catastrophic payments are defined as healthcare payments in 
excess of a predetermined percentage (i.e., 10 percent to 40 percent) of total household spending or 
nonfood spending. The three lines in Figure A2.1 show the catastrophic payment ‘headcount’, i.e., the 
proportion of households with a health payment budget share greater than the given threshold (10 
percent, 25 percent and 40 percent).  
In 1997, 4 percent of all households spent more than 10 percent of their total household spending on 
health payments. When health spending is compared against non-food consumption, or discretionary 
household spending, “catastrophic” spending is higher. In 1997, 12 percent of households spent more than 
10 percent of nonfood spending on health payments (Figure A2.1). This share declined to around 2 percent 
by 2010 and rose slightly to around 4 percent in 2014.  
Figure A2.1: Catastrophic Health Payments, in Percent of Nonfood Consumption 
 
Source: World Bank Analysis of Household Budget Surveys for Russia for 1997-2004 and 2010-2012. 
An important concern is whether catastrophic spending is concentrated among richer households, who 
may be able to draw on savings and other sources of income or among poorer households, who may not 
have a financial cushion. The concentration indices in Table A2.1 reveal with a 40 percent threshold 
whether there is a greater tendency for the better-off to have OOP spending in excess of the payment 
threshold (positive value), or whether the poor are more likely to have OOP spending in excess of the 
threshold (negative value). In Russia, large and positive concentration index values suggest that 
catastrophic spending was largely concentrated among richer households and increasingly so during the 
2000s.   
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Table A2.1: Catastrophic Payment Indices 
 
Total household 
consumption 
Nonfood 
consumption 
Year 40% 40% 
1997 0.580 0.159 
1998 0.404 0.019 
1999 0.199 -0.070 
2000 0.348 0.071 
2001 0.432 0.098 
2002 0.812 0.330 
2003 0.969 0.730 
2004 0.945 0.143 
2010 0.670 0.493 
2011 0.750 0.454 
2012 0.778 0.459 
2013 0.693 0.481 
2014 0.564 0.497 
Source: Author’s estimates as part of analysis carried out for the study. 
 
Impoverishing Health Expenditures 
Another approach to measure financial protection is to classify health spending as ‘impoverishing’ if it is 
sufficiently large push households over the poverty line, i.e., the household would not have been poor had 
it been able to use what it spent on healthcare for general consumption. In Russia, impoverishment is 
measured by estimating the percentage of households that are driven below the poverty line due to OOP 
spending (Figures A2.2 and A2.3).  
Figures A2.2 and A2.3 show the percentage of households (that have OOP spending) with total household 
consumption below the international poverty line of $7.50 per capita/day8 for the different years (blue 
segment of bars) and the percentage of households pushed below the poverty line as a result of OOP 
payments (red segment of bars). Notably, the percentage of households pushed below the poverty line as 
a result of OOP payments has been declining, though there was a slight increase in 2014.  
                                                          
8 Construction of international poverty lines: In the ECAPOV (ECA Poverty) surveys, expenditures are expressed in 
local currency units (LCU) per capita/day. We express the international poverty lines in LCU per capita/day. The 
international poverty lines were constructed using purchasing power parity (PPP) data from 2011 and by nomillay 
adjusting the value using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation rate between the survey year and 2011. 
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Figure A2.2: Impoverishment Due to OOP for 1997-2004* 
 
Notes: The years 1997-2004 and 2010-2014 are presented in different figures because of the large difference in the 
poverty headcount (see y-axis of both figures). 
Source: World Bank analysis of Household Budget Surveys for Russia for 1997-2004 and 2010-2012. 
 
Figure A2.3: Impoverishment Due to OOP for 2010-2014 
 
Notes: The years 1997-2004 and 2010-2014 are presented in different figures because of the large difference in the 
poverty headcount (see y-axis of both figures). 
Source: World Bank analysis of Household Budget Surveys for Russia for 1997-2004 and 2010-2012. 
 
 
 
